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CHAPTER SIXTEEN 
Practical Aspects 
of Emotion and Memory 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University 
Can anyone doubt that the study of emotion and memory should have 
practical implications? Surely not those among us who have had emotional 
experiences and sometimes try to forget them, to remember them, or to 
remember other things w hile having them. Extreme examples include the 
witness to a robbery and the victim of abuse. Less dramatically but far more 
commonly, anxious or depressed people perform everyday acts that are 
memory dependent. Indeed, a practical or useful science of memory should 
have a great deal to say about how memory works under such emotional 
conditions. 
Research on emotion and memory is also practical for the science at large, 
because it can extend the usefulness of a general theory. This practical 
aspect provides the g lu e  for this review. Together with many other re­
searchers in theoretical aspects of emotion and memory, I argue that the 
memorial correlates and consequences of emotion are best viewed as per­
taining to the effects of emotion on the focus and control of attention. This 
is a fortunate vantage point for practitioners, who want to know what they 
can and cannot depend on and control when emotion is involved in me­
morial episodes. Thus, this chapter briefly and selectively describes some 
recent literature on emotion and memory from the theoretical perspective 
of attentional control and from the practical perspective of how the findings 
might be useful to people who have feelings. 
The description is restricted to the domain of negative events and states. 
Elation, passion, other positive states, and the events that produce them also 
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deserve our attention but, apart from being difficult to capture or establish 
experimentally, they are unfortunately too transient in our culture to cry out 
for practical approaches. Further, although a wide variety of psychological 
phenomena, disorders, and practices are related to memory under negatively 
emotional circumstances, I describe only those that have received the most 
attention from cognitive psychologists: eyewitness, flashbulb, and possibly 
repressed memories, and the ubiquitous disorders of anxiety and depression. 
Even with these restrictions, the bodies of relevant research are still quite 
large; my description, therefore, often cites recently published reviews in­
stead of the important empirical investigations. Finally, a portion of the 
literature on depression and memory is examined in greater detail for pos­
sible therapeutic applications. 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The construct attention is central to many theoretical accounts of emotion 
and memory phenomena. Essentially, these phenomena can be understood 
as a function of the focus of attention during an initial episode or when it 
might come to mind on later occasions. The accounts described in this 
chapter differ according to the phenomena they were designed to address. 
What they all have in common is reference to a continuum of automatic to 
controlled mental procedures, as elucidated by early attention theorists like 
Kahneman 0973), Posner and Snyder 0975), and Shiffrin and Schneider 
0977). Briefly stated, automatic procedures are native to the organism or 
develop from practice. Although they sometimes can be intentionally initi­
ated or interrupted, they do not require attention or intention for their per­
formance. Controlled procedures, in contrast, are those that require attention 
or conscious focus. In spatial metaphors, controlled mental acts draw on 
limited attentional capacity. In this chapter, I argue that many accounts of 
emotion and memory emphasize the control of attention by emotional stimu­
lation as a predictor of performance on memory tasks. 
A convenient departure point is found in Bower's 0992) review of the role 
played by surprising events, both in engendering arousal and in focusing 
attention on critical aspects of the events. At the time of such focus, arousal 
activates the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and hormonal systems, which 
in turn directly affect storage activities in the brain (see Gold, 1992; LeDoux, 
1992; McGaugh, 1992). Similarly, Mandler 0992) claimed that "a majority of 
occasions for visceral (sympathetic nervous system) arousal follows the 
occurrence of some perceptual or cognitive discrepancy, or the interruption 
or blocking of some ongoing action" (p. 98). Mandler, as well as other emotion 
theorists (e.g., Oatley &Johnson-Laird, 1987), stressed the adaptive function 
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of the link between arousal and attention to discrepancies. The link functions 
to establish immediate resolution or future avoidance (see Bower, 1992). For 
example, Mineka 0992) suggested that vigilance for sources of threat, 
augmented by controlled procedures for directing attention away from the 
event (avoidance), can maintain fearful states on future occasions (see the 
earlier formulation of emotionally disordered memory by Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). What is ultimately implied by such accounts is 
that, although unexpected events incur arousal and initially demand attention, 
the linkage of arousal and attention does not guarantee memory for the 
initiating events; memory also depends on how attention is subsequently 
controlled and where it is focused. 
Among the first to address matters of attentional control during aroused 
states was Easterbrook 0959), who contended that increases in arousal are 
associated with a narrowing in the focus of attention. Later, several accounts 
of memory during emotional states seem to have combined the Easterbrook 
hypothesis with the idea that attentional capacity is reduced by arousal (see 
especially Hasher & Zacks, 1979). In summarizing his earlier work on both 
emotion and memory, Mandler (1992) stressed the limited capacity of con­
sciousness as the important factor in emotion/memory interactions. His the­
ory of memory makes the distinction between procedures for activating and 
procedures for elaborating: Activation is automatic, given an external stimu­
lus, and establishes later feelings of familiarity, whereas elaboration requires 
conscious or deliberate activity and establishes the pathways for retrieval. 
His theory of emotion stresses two features: arousal and expressed value. 
The former is visceral and produces internal events, whereas the latter reflects 
cognitive appraisal and requires attentional capacity. Therefore, "The expe­
rience of emotion preempts the limited capacity of consciousness .... [When 
this occurs] other processes that require such capacity will be impaired" 
(Mandler, 1992, p.  99). Some variant of this position has informed research 
on emotion and memory for approximately two decades. In particular, mem­
ory researchers have emphasized impairments in attention-demanding pro­
cedures (e.g., organization and elaboration) that support performance on 
later tests of deliberate memory. 
In short, the limitation on the focus of attention, central to all cognition, 
is also central to understanding interactions of emotion and memory. Internal 
stimulation, external stimulation, and related past stimulation all vie for at­
tention; an increase in the strength or distinctiveness of one source should 
mean that others are less well attended. Therefore, research efforts should­
and often do-concentrate on the focus of attention during episodes of 
possible emotional relevance. This approach has the parsimonious advantage 
of blending the findings of improved memory for events "in focus" and 
impaired memory for unattended aspects of experience. 
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MEMORY FOR EMOTIONAL EVENTS 
The nature of memoty for emotional events-naturally occurring or simu­
lated-depends on the focus of attention in a variety of ways. When events 
are surprising and therefore arousing: (a) attention is drawn to the central 
aspects that elicit the arousal via an innate orienting response, (b) those 
aspects enjoy the retention advantage of physiological arousal, and (c) their 
distinctiveness incurs elaborative processing that increases the chance that 
they will later come to mind. These claims have been abstracted primarily 
from Christianson's 0992) and Reisberg and Heuer's 0992) reviews of both 
real-world studies of eyewitness memory and laboratory simulations. It is 
important to keep in mind, however, that the nature of the event itself is 
often used to classify the memory as emotional. Arousal is sometimes as­
sumed, rather than measured, and when arousal can be assumed it is not 
necessarily accompanied by an evaluative component that, according to 
Mandler 0992), constructs an emotion. This issue arises in the ensuing 
synopses of research on eyewitness memory, flashbulb memory, and re­
pressed memories. 
Eyewitness Memory 
Based on the Easterbrook hypothesis, Christianson (1992) and Reisberg and 
Heuer 0992) argued that arousal restricts the focus of attention to the central 
details of presumably emotional events and therefore away from peripheral 
aspects, and thereby produces corresponding facilitation and impairment in 
memory for the respective aspects. Naturalistic studies of eyewitness testimony 
frequently show high positive correlations between judged emotionality (in 
retrospect) and both the reported vividness of the events and accurate memoty 
for their central details. In such studies, however, evidence regarding accuracy 
is typically obtained through comparisons across repeated tests (with all the 
accompanying potential confounds) and lacks the appropriate controls. 
Laboratory simulations have produced somewhat inconsistent results, but the 
inconsistency might be artifactual of whether accuracy or error is measured. 
In the latter case, findings of poor memory for arousing events might be due 
to confabulations to fill in the gaps established by the narrow focus of attention 
(see Reisberg & Heuer, 1992). On balance, both reviews conclude that 
laboratory findings are consistent with the attentional-focus account. 
Orientation to the central details of arousing events cannot, however, be 
solely responsible for enhanced memory, according to Christianson 0992). 
When eye fixations were controlled during initial exposure to emotional or 
neutral slides, memory for the fixated details was enhanced by emotional 
content. These findings suggest that ANS arousal and accompanying hor­
monal changes increase retention (see Gold, 1992). Christianson also pro-
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posed that ongoing arousal might underlie findings of poor performance on 
immediate tests, due to "the difficulties in refiring of those neurons that are 
firing repeatedly in the reverberating circuit" (p. 299). In a related vein, 
Reisberg and Heuer 0992) suggested that the physiological effects of arousal 
on encoding ultimately slow the rate of forgetting central details. Physiologi­
cal prcx:lucts of arousal might therefore account for findings of better memory 
for emotional events only after a delay in testing. 
Long-term retention of emotional events might also be facilitated by their 
distinctiveness, according to both reviews. For example, Christianson 0992) 
noted that the role of distinctiveness is separable from that of emotional 
arousal, because parallel findings are obtained with nonemotional but unusual 
events. The role of distinctiveness, in the sense of the unexpected, however, 
might not be separable from that of physiological arousal and accompanying 
retention via ANS mechanisms (see Bower, 1992). Therefore, it might be more 
important to separate effects of distinctiveness from those of elaboration. 
When distinctive events are elaboratively processed (compared to when they 
are not), we typically see a greater advantage on tests of deliberate remem­
bering (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). Furthermore, the degree of elaborative 
processing might be limited by the focus of attention on one's aroused state. 
In that regard, it is interesting to consider the recent analysis of eyewitness 
memory for traumatic events by Yuille and Tollestrup 0992). In a manner 
consistent with Mandler's framework, these authors argued that arousal ac­
companying "remarkable" events is sometimes associated with an internal 
focus on the physiological state itself. Under those circumstances, even mem­
ory for central details should be impaired. Laboratory research should there­
fore investigate the conditions that differentiate internal from external atten­
tional foci. This issue is also relevant in investigations of another class of 
remarkable events: flashbulb memories. 
Flashbulb Memories 
Flashbulb memories are supposed to be emotional. In fact, a recent volume 
of papers on the topic was entitled Affect and Accuracy in Recall (Winograd 
& Neisser, 1992). Brown and Kulik (1977) coined the term.flashbulb to refer 
to personal memories of finding out about culturally important events (such 
as the assassinations of public figures) and claimed that surprise and expected 
consequentiality of the event are their identifying characteristics. These two 
characteristics have been inconsistently measured (and usually in the absence 
of appropriate controls), but when they do co-occur the phenomenon mighr 
qualify as an emotional memory according to Mandler's criteria (cf. Mandler, 
1992). This is because surprise can be counted on to invoke arousal, and 
expected consequentiality suggests that the arousal is evaluated in a cognitive 
context. For example, in a recent multinational study, Conway et al. (1994) 
recruited subjects who were likely to vary in the extent to which the event 
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(Thatcher's resignation) would be perceived as important and potentially 
consequential. They found that the initially reported strength of emotional 
reaction mediated the formation of flashbulb memories when the initially 
perceived importance of the event was high. However, because none of these 
measures was taken at the time of reception we cannot be sure that the event 
itself was emotional. This is typically the case. 
In general, evidence regarding flashbulb memories is difficult to interpret, 
at best (see Brewer, 1992). The tradition is to measure memory for the 
reception event (the subject's own experience) rather than the original event, 
presumably because people hear the news from others rather than witnessing 
it firsthand. (Otherwise, of course, the phenomenon would be eyewitness 
memory.) Reception events usually leave no permanent objective record; 
therefore, researchers are almost always in the position of measuring memory 
for a memory, and consistency is not the same as accuracy (see McCloskey, 
Wibble, & Cohen, 1988). Moreover, appropriate control events are hard to 
identify (see Brewer, 1992). Another interpretive difficulty is invited by lack 
of knowledge regarding the focus of attention during reception, although 
some evidence suggests that central details from the initial report are quite 
well remembered (see Christianson, 1992). Reisberg and Heuer 0992) sug­
gested that attention is likely to be focused on other people, whose own 
emotional reactions are unexpected in the context of everyday relations. 
Social aspects of remembering the flashbulb event were stressed by Loftus 
and Kaufman 0992); one's audience at the time of remembering directs the 
nature of the report. Such social functions also remind us that elaborative 
procedures can easily produce inaccuracies in memory for eyewitness and 
flashbulb events. In attending to related information (elaborating) during the 
flashbulb event or its rehearsal, we increase the likelihood that such informa­
tion will be the focus of attention on subsequent occasions of remembering. 
Finally, Brewer 0992) alerted us to consider distinctiveness to be a po­
tentially potent variable in understanding flashbulb memories, given its im­
portance in ordinary personal memories. Events that are considered surpris­
ing and personally important should undergo elaborative processing for the 
purpose of reconciliation, according to evolutionary frameworks (see Wil­
liams et al., 1988), unless the event is threatening and therefore sets the 
occasion for avoidance. Although they might sometimes evoke emotions, 
flashbulb events pose little or no personal threat, unlike the events assumed 
to be responsible for the next category of emotional memories. 
"Repressed and Recovered" Memories 
Eyewitness, flashbulb, and presumably repressed memories are all records 
of distinctive events, although the last category is surely more personally 
relevant and arousing (Loftus & Kaufman, 1992). Because records of the 
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original flashbulb (reception) event and previously repressed events are 
rarely obtainable, the conservative stance is to doubt the special status ac­
corded to each class of memory phenomena, and particularly to doubt the 
accuracy of "recovered" memories of previously repressed events. Loftus 
(see Loftus & Kaufman, 1992) cautioned us to consider that recovered memo­
ries might be replete with error motivated by social context, just like flashbulb 
memories, and urged us to examine the social functions of such reports. 
Compared to recovery, the concept of repression itself has received more 
attention by memory researchers (see the review by Holmes, 1990). According 
to Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1990), for example, repression functions to deny con­
trolled access to prior experience, and this function suggests various attention­
centered explanations. Guided by ongoing motives (see Simon, 1994), atten­
tion can be diverted from the traumatic event and reduce the degree of 
elaborative processing. Similarly, attention can also be diverted away from 
later cues for reminding. Kihlstrom and Hoyt (1990) argued that the person 
might initially be aware of unwanted thoughts produced by such cues and 
deliberately avoid thinking about them in ways more akin to intentional 
suppression than to repression. But through practice, they argued, suppres­
sion becomes automatic and resembles repression. In a different vein, Bower 
0990) suggested that repressionlike failures could also result from retroactive 
interference by incompatible and much more common experiences in .the
 
same domain; later recovery would then arise from the use of appropriate 
retrieval cues in the therapeutic context. Like Loftus, howe:er, he warn�d that 
distortions are likely. In these ways the focus of attention at the tim: of 
remembering accounts for repression and possible recovery or confabulation. 
Therapists suspect repression when they observe emotional reactio� that 
seem unusual in the client's current context and therefore suggestive of 
certain kinds of earlier emotional experiences. In this regard, Tobias, 
Kihlstrom, and Schacter (1992) argued that when emotional responses them­
selves reflect the effects of past experience, they belong to the category of 
implicit memory phenomena, because the subject does not intentionally 
invoke the past in making the response. Although some of the measures 
used experimentally to support this claim do not qualify as full-blown emo­
tional reactions, they have affective characteristics. Johnson and Multhaup 
0992), for example, reviewed studies in the mere-exposure effect on pref­
erences for unfamiliar melodies and people; in Korsakoff patients, such 
effects are dissociated from recognition judgments. Tobias et al. 0992) de­
scribed clinical case studies in which a variety of affectively related measures 
(e.g., judgments of emotional value) showed similar dissociations from tra­
ditional measures of intentional remembering. Furthermore, these examples 
in the literature on human memory are reminiscent of a variety of studies 
that used truly emotional responses by other organisms as evidence of prior 
learning. In this regard, LeDoux 0992) reviewed evidence for the "indelibility 
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of emotional memory" (p. 279). This evidence suggests that emotion as 
memory cannot be extinguished, even though the event that gives rise to 
the emotion might be forgotten. 
Finally, perhaps the best developed model of emotion as memory in 
humans is Johnson's MEM (see Johnson & Multhaup, 1992). Johnson pro­
posed that perceptual and reflective subsystems differentially contribute to 
affective experiences. "Recapturing affect [emotion as memory] depends on 
whether it is possible to reinstate the records of the initial processing that 
led to the initial affective response" (p. 58). If the initial episcxle was not 
elaborated in the reflective subsystems, failures in deliberate recall are likely. 
However, perceptual characteristics of a current context that are similar to 
those of an earlier traumatic event certainly could evoke arousal along a 
generalization gradient. Through practice, such arousal could be accompa­
nied by diversion of attention. Moreover, a skillful redirection of attention 
during emotional episodes might have some small chance of recovering a 
repressed memory if perceptual memories are sought. In contrast, cuing via 
reflective subsystems invites dangers of elaborative distortions. In short, the 
concept of attention is central to understanding that tmly traumatic experi­
ences affect subsequent behavior in the absense of aware remembering (the 
hallmark of suspected repression). It may also be central to designing ex­
perimental analogues for the recovery of repressed memories. 
Practical Guidelines 
What can we tell the practitioner? Because arousal directs, narrows, or re­
directs the focus of attention in presumably automatic ways, initial control 
may be difficult, if not impossible. Beyond that point, avenues for self-in­
itiated and environmentally directed control should be examined, particularly 
in the context of understanding that motives direct attention. In describing 
the experimental psychologist's approach to understanding repression, for 
example, Bower 0990) compared it to motivated "unlearning" and forget­
ting. Presumably, most of us are motivated to remember what we were 
doing on some culturally important occasion and to forget more personally 
traumatic events (unless legal or retributional motives exist at the time). 
Clearly, the motivation to comply with instmctions in nonemotional labora­
tory settings can guide attention during initial exposure and subsequently 
(see Bower, 1990), but is such control possible when the event is "emo­
tional"? Issues arising from this question concern the effects of arousal on 
initiating and sustaining attention in ways related to one's motives (fulfilling 
intentions). For example, if the experience invokes conscious evaluation of 
arousal, attention should be hard to focus on peripheral aspects potentially 
relevant to one's prior intentions. In effect, the arousing event may establish 
new motives that direct attention to their service. Much the same might be 
said when emotional states are not established directly hy the current event. 
16. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF EMOTION AND MEMORY 325 
MEMORY IN EMOTIONAL STATES 
There is a fine line between memory for emotional events and memory in 
emotional states. One way to draw it is to note whether the event produces 
the state (as is assumed in the research described above). When the state 
precedes the event to be remembered, I classify the phenomena as memory 
in emotional states. In this category, the event itself might be emotional 
(although verbal materials related to emotions often constitute the "events" 
in such research). If so, researchers usually are interested in mood-congruent 
and mood-incongruent memories. If not, research is aimed at understanding 
the conditions for impaired memory in emotional states. In both categories 
of research, a variety of complicating factors arises from the need to under­
stand the state itself. 
Sometimes research participants have been diagnosed as emotionally 
disordered, sometimes they are selected from nondiagnosed populations 
according to their responses on various mood inventories, and sometimes they 
volunteer to be placed in transient moods. To what extent do arousal and its 
evaluation characterize these states? Although some researchers in the area 
argue that experimentally induced moods are more intense, others make 
distinctions between mood and emotion on the basis that arousal characterizes 
only the latter (see Mandler, 1992). However, the degree of arousal surely 
varies according to the induction technique or the specific disorder, and within 
these categories as well. For examples of low arousal, consider endogenous 
depression without accompanying anxiety, or the lethargic states established 
by some induction techniques (see Revelle & Loftus, 1992). Regarding the 
focus of attention on one's aroused state, it is important to know that most 
clinical disorders are characterized by self-focused attention (see the review 
by Ingram, 1990). Some mood-induction techniques, however, seem to be 
characterized by experimental "demand" in ways that are irrelevant to one's 
state. Subjects might be cued by the nature of the induction to focus attention 
on particular materials or encouraged to conform to implied expectations for 
poor attention and performance. (We should also be alert to demand charac­
teristics of some selection procedures.) As well, there are reasons to believe 
that effects established by inductions differ from those in natural states (e.g., 
Hertel & Rude, 1991b). That possibility, coupled with a concern for practical 
value, has led me to emphasize studies on naturally occurring emotional states 
and disorders in the following description. 
Emotion-Congruent Attention and Memory 
The ensuing description is guided by Williams et al.'s 0988) evolutionary 
perspective on attention and memory in anxious and depressed people, 
because it was developed to address clinical phenomena in the context of 
traditional cognitive research. The main idea is that anxiety evolved to fa-
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cilitate detection and subsequent avoidance of potential threat, whereas 
depression evolved to facilitate reflection on loss and failure. In cognitive 
terms, "anxiety preferentially affects the passive, automatic aspect of encod­
ing and retrieval, whereas depression preferentially affects the more active, 
effortful aspects of encoding and retrieval" (Williams et al., 1988, p. 173). 
The term preferentially is the key to understanding emotionally congruent 
biases in attention and subsequent memory. 
Recently, Mathews and MacLeod 0994) reviewed evidence thac anxious 
people have trouble ignoring or inhibiting emotionally congruent aspects 
of events and show selective detection of these aspects. (Such biases are 
found in the performance of depressed subjects only to the extent that 
anxiety is also present.) The bias seems to emerge when the emotional 
nature of the materials varies within trials not across which suggests that 
the nature of the bias is to prioritize detecti�n. In anxiecy the bias is automatic 
rather than intentional, because it occurs when subjects cannot report the 
content (e.g., in studies using masked Stroop techniques). 
Mathews and MacLeod's (1994) review also concluded that self-referential 
tasks performed at initial exposure produce better recall for congruent ma­
terial, but only when they are performed by depressed people. This effect 
is usually attributed to elaborative processing, achieved by focusing attention 
on related thoughts and events, particularly when they are perceived as 
"causally belonging" to one's mood state (Bower, 1992). Elaboration estab­
lishes attentional procedures whereby the event can be deliberately brought 
to mind on later occasions. In fact, evidence of emotional congruence in 
depression seems to be restricted to performance on tests of deliberate 
remembering (e.g., Denny & Hunt, 1992). Implicit memory tests-to the 
extent that they invite more automatic procedures--might be expected to 
show emotionally congruent effects with anxious subjects (see Williams et 
al., 1988), but the few studies that have done so have not been replicated 
(also see Mineka, 1992). 
In general, Mathews and MacLeod found no solid evidence for threat­
congruent memory in anxiety. This is to be expected if anxious people 
subsequently focus attention away from detected sources of threat, both 
during initial exposure and on later occasions, in order to avoid further 
arousal. Indeed, sometimes impaired memory for threat-related materials is 
found. The consequence, according to Mineka 0992), is that in natural 
environments the lack of controlled attention to the source of potential threat 
prevents an accurate evaluation of its extent and perpetuates anxiety. On 
the other hand, depression might be exacerbated by attention to negative 
aspects of current and prior experience (see Williams, 1992). 
Depression is characterized by automatic negative thoughts and rumina­
tions (see Beck, 1976; Gotlib, 1992). Ruminations involve sustained attention 
that is presumably motivated by the urge to resolve discordance associated 
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with the negative thought and to escape the depressed mood. These implicit 
goals, however, may be almost impossible to reach when the content of the 
automatic thought is particularly traumatic. Then, the person is motivated 
to suppress such u nwanted thoughts, because they ultimately serve to ex­
acerbate the mood. (Evidence for mood-incongruent recall of less traumatic 
negative materials may have similar roots in mood regulation; see Parrott & 
Sabini, 1990.) According to Wegner 0989), thought supp�ession is achieved 
initially by focusing attention on random distractors in the environment; 
however, through repeated attempts and failures, these distractors become 
associated with the unwanted thoughts and (ironically) serve to cue them. 
This "rebound" effect appears to be stronger for emotionally charged and 
unresolved events than for neutral content. 
Wegner's (1989) treatment of the rebound effect places it in the category 
of implicit memory paradigms. The thought comes to mind in the absense 
of intent to remember-indeed, in the presence of the intent not to remem­
ber. As such, when past events come to mind against one's will, the memory 
process can truly be described as automatic (Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 
1993). In this regard, the rebound effect shows evidence of mood congruence 
(e.g., Howell & Conway, 1992), unlike other paradigms that presumably 
measure implicit memory. 
Impaired Memory 
Although depressed people are bothered incessantly by automa�ic negativ� 
thoughts, they complain about poor memory. What they �e�n is that their 
deliberate attempts to remember often fail. Indeed, there ts ltttle reason to 
notice that memory functions "normally" in more automatic or implicit ways 
(provided that the original event had been attended; see Hertel, 1994; Hertel 
& Hardin, 1990). Similarly, the literature on memory impairments in both 
anxious and depressed states has concentrated on tests of deliberate remem­
bering. Consider first the case of anxiety. 
Anxiety might indeed establish priorities for detecting and subsequently 
avoiding threatening events, but how should it affect memory when threat 
is absent? In line with Easterbrook (1959), Eysenck (1982) noted that anxious 
arousal might impair memory by narrowing the focus of attention during 
initial exposure in ways that exclude important aspects of more attention­
demanding tasks. When arousal has been measured, however, it seems to 
have contributed little to the relationship between anxiety and performance 
(see Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Further, Eysenck and others also noted that 
arousal is just one component of anxiety. The other component-worry­
represents the focus of attention on self-relevant and typically distracting 
information. Although distraction should impair subsequent memory, anx­
ious subjects sometimes compensate for their distractibility by increasing the 
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effort they expend on the task, because they are motivated to avoid the 
negative consequences of failure. (In other words, imagined failure can be 
a source of threat to be avoided by anxious people. ) In this regard, Eysenck 
and Calvo 0992) proposed that processing efficiency (a ratio of effectiveness 
to effort) is impaired; anxious people expend more effort to maintain a 
certain level of effectiveness and are therefore less efficient (see Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992, for a review of the relevant literature). 
This account of performance in anxious states is both similar to and different 
from typical accounts of performance in depressed states. Both stress the 
importance of attentional factors, but the latter suggest that depression limits 
the degree of effort that can be applied to cognitive tasks (e.g., Hasher & 
Zacks, 1979; Williams et al., 1988). (Some research in social cognition is much 
more consistent with Eysenck & Calvo's framework, however; the review by 
Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993, suggests that depression is associ­
ated with increased effort, motivated by the desire for control. ) 
In one of the more frequently cited accounts of depression and memory, 
Ellis and Ashbrook (1988) claimed "that being sad ties up some capacity as 
a result of thinking about one's sad state, so that less capacity is available 
to be allocated to the criterion task" (p. 27). Their support for this assumption 
was provided by evidence of impaired recall of materials from more difficult 
or attention demanding tasks. The key factor in their claim, however, is not 
"tied-up" or reduced capacity, as stressed by the authors and others (e.g., 
Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993), but the embedded assumption 
regarding the focus of attention. The experimental support described earlier, 
for example, was established by mood-induction techniques; in the "de­
pressed" condition, college subjects read statements designed to focus their 
attention on feeling sad, hopeless, and lethargic. Subsequent experiments 
on thought listing following such inductions in fact showed that this atten­
tional focus was maintained during a criterion task (Seibert & Ellis, 1991). 
Therefore, neutral and self-irrelevant materials from "orienting" tasks are 
peripheral to the focus of attention and should suffer on later tests of de­
liberate memory, as can be seen in studies of memory for emotional events 
(see Christianson, 1992). 
Can we assume that attention is similarly focused away from neutral 
aspects when the subjects are naturally depressed? Unwanted thoughts tend 
to occur on occasions when the mind is not otherwise occupied (Bower, 
1992; Wegner, 1989). Such occasions include those during which there is 
little environmental control of attention, such as Bower's example of falling 
asleep at night. Probably a large proportion of tasks used in memory research 
poorly controls the focus of attention. For example, because we generously 
provide time for subjects to perform incidental orienting tasks, their minds 
can wander until the next display. Some subjects, however, do show what 
my colleagues and I have called "cognitive initiative" (see Hertel & Hardin, 
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1990); they continue to focus attention on the task and related materials in 
ways that are not required by our instructions. Later, during recall and 
recognition tasks, we do not tell subjects precisely what to think about, but 
some subjects voluntarily attend to elements of the past and present that 
help them perform. Some subjects behave strategically. Of course, these are 
the processes we want to bring under experimental control so that we can 
establish their causal importance, but when experimental constraints are 
imperfect, performance varies as a function of the degree to which such 
processes are self-initiated. Depressed and dysphoric people are among 
those who initiate the least. 
Depressed subjects comply with stated instructions, but during periods 
of loose attentional control their minds go blank or wander to task irrelevant 
matters--perhaps to matters of personal concern. Compared to our typical 
laboratory tasks, such matters motivate attention. Furthermore, if the focus 
of attention, rather than reduced capacity, is the key to understanding mem­
ory impairments in depression, we ought to be able to sidestep the need 
for initiative by controlling the focus of attention on the task and thereby 
reduce or eliminate the impairment. Consider the following experiment with 
clinically depressed subjects and controls (Hertel & Rude, 1991a). In one 
condition, attention during the orienting task was poorly constrained (as it 
was in the research cited by Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), and subsequent free 
recall of targets from the more difficult trials was reduced in the depressed 
sample. In another condition, however, we constrained attention during 
initial exposure and eliminated the deficit in subsequent recall. The de­
pressed sample performed more slowly on a secondary task during both 
orienting conditions, and so low task motivation or even reduced capacity 
might characterize their state. Regardless, the important point is that so-called 
capacity limitations did not predict recall when initiative was not required. 
In the experiments by Hertel and Rude (1991a, 1991b), recall was most 
likely determined by the degree of initial elaboration (attention to the target's 
context). Free recall is the classic test of deliberate memory; it encourages 
a good deal of focus on past events and therefore benefits from such focus 
during initial exposure (see Jacoby et al., 1993). In contrast, word-identifi­
cation tests that indirectly measure prior experience (i.e., more old than new 
words are identified at brief exposures) benefit primarily from prior integra­
tion of letters into words. Procedures for activating lexical units are assumed 
to be automatic under normal reading conditions. Instructions to attend to 
the perceptual features of the word's display, however, are not normal 
reading conditions, and under these conditions reading should require some 
initiative. In this regard, the performance on a subsequent test of word-iden­
tification revealed a decreased effect of prior exposure in the depressed 
sample, compared to the controls (Hertel, 1994). During the perceptual 
orienting task, the depressed subjects apparently attended less often to the 
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words themselves, because such attention was not required. When the ori­
enting task had instructed them to judge the emotional value of the words, 
however, the effect of prior exposure on word identification was comparable 
to that in the control group. In this case, reading was required and other 
potentially self-initiated procedures during initial exposure would not be 
expected to improve performance on the test of word identification. More­
over, this and other indirect memory tests are probably less likely to invite 
self-initiated reflections on the past. For example, a test of homophone 
spelling showed no depression-related effect of prior exposure to one of 
the two meanings of each homophone (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). 
Compared to indirect tests, recognition tests provide more interesting 
opportunities for exploring the possible effects of impaired initiative in de­
pression-particularly with regard to the control of attention during the test 
itself. For example, compared to controls, dysphoric students have shown 
impairments in recollection-the component of recognition judgments that 
represents a self-initiated focus on the past context of target items-but 
comparable reliance on familiarity, the more automatic aspect of recognition 
(Hertel & Milan, 1994). Further, in our earlier research on recognition, only 
the nondysphoric subjects appeared to focus attention systematically on 
remembering the target's context in two prior tasks and to discount familiarity 
as a basis for judgment (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). When, in a subsequent 
experiment, we guided the dysphoric subjects to use that attentional strategy, 
their recognition judgments revealed the same pattern that characterized the 
unguided judgments by their nondysphoric counterparts. Other studies also 
support an initiative account of recognition in depressed states (e.g., Chan­
non, Baker, & Robertson, 1993). 
Reduced cognitive initiative in depressed states is consistent with symp­
toms of hopelessness (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989) and perceived 
lack of control of both internal and external events (Beck, 1976). It can also 
be understood in neurophysiological terms. In particular, a connection be­
tween depression (as well as other emotional disorders) and attentional 
control should be found in frontal-lobe hypoactivation (see Grafman, 1989). 
According to Henriques and Davidson 0991), "loss of initiative, impaired 
concentration, indecision .. . are all symptoms common to patients with left 
anterior lesions and certain subtypes of depression" (p. 535). Their evidence 
from EEG recordings of clinically depressed (unlesioned) subjects lends 
further support to this connection. Mayes (1988) concluded that patients 
with lesions in the frontal lobes exhibit deficits that "arise when remembering 
requires the initiation and maintenance of effortful and organized strategies 
.. . as well as the ability to switch from one strategy to another" (p. 121). 
In PET studies, hypoactivation in the frontal lobes has been linked to both 
depression (Resnick, 1992) and reduced attentional control (Posner, 1992). 
In the context of frontal-lobe hypoactivation, moreover, other brain functions 
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can continue to direct attention and mediate retention of emotionally relevant 
events (McGaugh, 1992). 
In short, at least some evidence from varied research domains paints a 
picture of depressed people as those who readily attend to emotionally 
negative events, ruminate about them in ways that exacerbate their depres­
sion, and are not motivated to attend to other matters that might not only 
benefit performance on subsequent memory tasks but aid recovery (see 
Hertel, 1992). Rather than insisting that this picture is inevitable (e.g., by 
stressing that depression reduces capacity), however, we should realize that 
in matters of attentional control, depressed people need a little help from 
their friends--or at least from their therapists. 
Practical Aspects of Memory in Depressed States: 
Implications for Treatment 
The most obvious and perhaps the most frequently discussed avenue for 
applyirig research on depression and memory lies in the clinical domain­
particularly in the practices of cognitive-behavioral therapy (see Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Although this tradition has been "cognitive" only in 
the loosest sense of the term, recently some attempts have been made to 
connect the practices with experimental findings and theories in cognitive 
psychology. 
First, experimental evidence regarding the tendency to focus attention on 
negative aspects of current and prior experience can be used in assessment. 
For example, vulnerability to depression might be better detected in per­
formance on cognitive tasks than in self-reports (Williams et al., 1988). Simi­
larly, Nasby and Kihlstrom (1986) discussed applications to assess the po­
tential usefulness of particular interventions. Therapists should also take 
evidence for mood congruent recall into account in evaluating the client's 
autobiographical reports. 
More typically, evidence for biased attention and recall in depression has 
been related to treatment domains. For example, cognitive-behavioral ther­
apy includes procedures to alter negative thoughts by encouraging clients 
to use their own behavior to test their beliefs (Beck et al., 1979). In a closer 
analysis of how that might work, Ingram and Hollon 0986) suggested that 
such self-monitorirlg procedures tend to be freer from distortions than is 
retrospective recall; the results of monitoring can then be elaborated during 
therapy sessions. In that setting, moreover, Nasby and Kihlstrom 0986) 
recommended that therapists optimize attention to their feedback by placing 
clients in happier moods prior to reinterpreting their behavior in less negative 
terms than the client tends to use. 
Evidence for mood-incongruent recall and the suppression of negative 
thoughts is also relevant to treatment, particularly if one switches therapeutic 
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horses to psychodynamic perspectives. When such mechanisms of "defense" 
seem ineffective, the therapist might be inclined to encourage clients to 
reveal early traumatic experiences. Although, as previously described, at­
tempts to recover presumably repressed memories are fraught with recon­
structive dangers, Harber and Pennebaker (1992) advocated procedures for 
encouraging the revelation of suppressed (if not repressed) thoughts. They 
argued that, in the long run, by virtue of associated increases in ANS and 
CNS activity, thought suppression is a biological stressor that produces a 
range of health problems and various cognitive side effects (e.g., stressful 
dreams). "Confrontation" (by attending to the suppressed memory) should 
therefore reduce these effects. Support for this latter claim mainly comes 
from experiments in which college students are randomly assigned to write 
or speak about either traumatic or mundane events from the past. Outcomes 
in the "trauma" groups include a subsequently reduced number of physical 
complaints. With respect to depression, Harber and Pennebaker implied that 
disclosure should alleviate general distress by focusing attention on the 
traumatic memory in the presumably safer context of their present lives. 
Finally, compared to applications of research on emotionally biased cog­
nition, the literature contains many fewer attempts to address general im­
pairments in depression. One of the few by Watts Macleod and Morris 
0988), documented the remediation of m�mory ancl concentr;tion difficul­
ties through imagery training, although subjects did not report a subjectively 
experienced benefit and therefore might not initiate the procedures in the 
absense of instructions. In fact, as noted by Williams et al. (1988), there has 
been little research regarding transfer of remediative strategies outside the 
therapeutic or experimental setting. 
General impairments in depression are typically noted along quantitative 
dimensions (e.g., fewer words recalled); however, qualitative aspects of 
recall might be equally important for therapeutic applications. In that regard, 
Williams and his colleagues (see Williams, 1992) found that the proportion 
of specific memories reported in autobiographical protocols was smaller in 
groups of patients diagnosed with major depression than in various control 
groups. Furthermore, this tendency toward overgeneral memories did not 
depend on the degree of the patients' current mood disturbance. Therapists 
should, therefore, not assume that overgeneral recall will disappear when 
mood is temporarily better. Instead, Williams argued, therapists should try 
to change the processes leading to overgeneral recall. Therapy for depressed 
clients should include: practice in noticing the tendency toward overgeneral 
recall, training in procedures for remembering specific aspects of both posi­
tive and negative memories (so that the former can be elaborated and the 
latter reinterpreted), and using diaries for recording specific details, to aid 
attention at the outset. More generally, Williams 0992) advocated the de­
velopment of strategies that transfer to nontherapeutic settings. 
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Cognitive-behavioral therapy sometimes includes "behavioral activation 
strategies" that are designed to transfer to the real world (Ingram & Hollon, 
1986). Specific procedures (e.g., graded tasks) are designed to produce 
success through the environmental control of attention. Other therapeutic 
procedures are designed to teach clients to initiate controlled procedures 
through practice in doing so. And preparation for termination of therapy 
emphasizes that the skills gained in therapy can be used for future control. 
Ultimately, such procedures should, according to Ingram and Hollon (1986), 
decrease self-focused attention that has become maladaptively strong in 
depressed clients. Moreover, they clearly illustrate that refocusing attention 
is the key to therapeutic intervention and implicitly assume adequate atten­
tional capacity. The central question, however, is whether the procedures 
can be initiated during future times of distress, when potentially more pow­
erful motivations guide the focus of attention, impair memory for unattended 
aspects, and reinstigate the depressive state. 
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